International joint ventures (IJVs) are an important modern organisational form, with their complexity presenting significant management and control issues. Our research uses a crosssectional survey of Australian parent partners of IJVs to provide insights into the characteristics of Australian companies and their IJVs, performance outcomes and choices of parent partners management control systems (MCS) design in terms of operational areas they seek to control (focus), the extent to which they exercise control (extent) and the mechanisms of control used (formal and informal). Australian parent partners of IJVs generally are; partnering in countries close to Australia in the Asia Pacific, in activities similar to those they undertake in Australia, contributing a significant amount of resources, but overall have only a limited range IJV experience. Australian parent partners focus on a limited set of controls, often with tighter formalised control structures. Finally they are overall satisfied with the performance of their IJVs, with higher satisfaction for organisation learning and product/customer dimensions than financial performance.
International joint ventures (IJVs) are an important modern organisational form.
Multinational corporations use IJVs as a key option for pursuing international strategies (Harrigan 1988; Hergert and Morris 1988; Geringer and Woodcock 1989; Geringer 1991; Parkhe 1993) , especially in countries where joint ventures are a regulatory condition of entry to domestic markets (Beamish and Banks 1987; Geringer 1991) . From a strategic point of view, IJVs are used to exploit peripheral markets or technologies, and are perceived as critical elements of an organisation's business networks, as strategic weapons for competing within core markets and technologies (Harrigan 1987) , and as a way of facilitating interorganisational learning (Buckley and Casson 1988; Hamel 1991; Makhija and Ganesh 1997) .
In addition, successful IJVs create synergies and enhance economic rents to the partners resulting from risk reduction, economies of scale and scope, production rationalisation, convergence of technologies, and better local acceptance (Harrigan 1988a (Harrigan , 1988b Hennart 1988; Parkhe 1993) . IJVs, therefore, represent an important and effective way for multinational organisations to compete globally (Perlmutter and Heenan 1986) .
Pursuing IJV strategies involves significant issues in controlling their venture operations. A parent partner must share control with other partner(s) and face constraints imposed by contractual and legal requirements. Often one partner may enjoy competitive cultural/language advantage and privileged access to information, and may have different (sometime conflicting) interests to the other IJV partner(s) (Anderson 1990; Beamish 1984; Fey 1995; Southworth 1994) . Parent partners, therefore, face significant challenges in designing and operating management controls systems able to effectively monitor and control the operations of their IJVs (Anderson 1990; Dolan 1993a Dolan , 1993b Luo 1995) .
Inter-organisational Collaboration
IJVs are one of many forms of inter-organisational networks. Figure 1 summarises the interrelationship of the major factors that may lead to networks as a mean to achieve organisational objectives. In accordance with traditional organisational analysis, an organisation's strategy and objectives are determined by the organisation's own internal resources (strengths and weaknesses) and environmental opportunities and pressures (threats and opportunities). Flexibility in committing scarce resources, risk-sharing, access to critical business resources, increasing environmental complexity, higher degrees of market interrelationships, the emergence of new developing economies and the shift from traditional national markets to global markets are some of the factors that create significant pressures for organisations to pursue a strategy of inter-organisational collaboration rather than intraorganisational expansion, and therefore determine the 'Need to network' shown in Figure 1 (Beamish 1988; Schillaci 1988; Contractor and Lorange 1988; Shenkar and Tallman 1993; Mjoen and Tallman 1997) .
Organisational strategy and objectives
Internal resources, technology and expertise (strengths and weaknesses)
Relationship with the environment (threats and opportunities)
Need to network
Figure 1
Factors impacting the need to network
There are many forms of networks ranging from informal to formal, short-term to long-term and comprising two or more partners. A joint venture is a form of inter-organisational network where two or more partners enter into an agreement to form a new entity (the JV) to undertake a given set of activities with the aim of achieving agreed objectives. Partners share capital, income, expenditure, profit/losses, management, risk and benefits in accordance with agreed arrangements and proportions.
Historically, the term joint venture was used in the United States (US) to describe a speculative association of firms promoted to undertake very risky projects. With time the speculative nature of the venture became less important and JVs developed as a form of association between firms aimed at undertaking activities (rather than a project) in common (Schillaci 1988) . Different characteristics across partners, motives, strategies or objectives, different types of projects, characteristics of the operating environment, and the type of resources made available by parent partners are some of the features that give rise to a variety of forms of joint venture collaboration.
In general, the main distinguishing characteristic of JVs is the creation of a separate entity owned by two or more partners who keep their own financial, operational and legal identity and autonomy. Also, the new entity is the result of the parent partners' determination to engage in a collaborative venture, not just an investment. Many motives lead companies to JVs. Often, the motives differ across each partner and on many occasions may even be conflicting. Nevertheless, the decision to form a JV derives from the belief by each partner that despite different/conflicting goals, the benefits of collaboration may outweigh the costs.
JVs can be classified into different types according to their legal or organisational features, location and nature of project/activities. JVs formed by companies originating from the same country, and operating in the same country as the parent partners, are defined as domestic joint ventures. When parent partners' headquarters are located in different countries or the JV has a significant level of operations in more than one country the JV is considered international (Groot and Merchant 2000) , which may operate in either developed or developing countries. They are often generated by government regulations imposing the JV business structure on international companies wishing to enter developing country markets. In this way it is hoped that local firms may gain experience, transfer knowledge and technology, leading in the medium/long term to independent operations. More significant economic, cultural and social differences are likely to give rise to special control issues in these IJVs. While government regulations may provide for equal legal shares in the joint ventures, actual resource contribution and other factors may determine a de facto dominance by one partner.
A review of the literature suggests that IJVs, similar to other international operations, face greater operational and management challenges than domestic JVs (Groot and Merchant 2000) . In addition to the need to 'share' control with other partner(s), parent partners face difficulties in monitoring operations in settings they are not familiar with compounded by physical distance, by time differences, cultural barriers, social barriers, human resource and employee relation differences (Child and Faulkner 1998) .
In summary, the above factors all result in greater organisational complexity, making the management of international joint ventures a very challenging task (Child 1991; Child and Markoczy 1993; Beamish 1993) . Traditional management control systems, performance evaluation procedures and accounting information used to control and evaluate fully owned subsidiaries or short-term specific project ventures, may not be applicable to international JVs (Anderson 1990; Dolan 1993a Dolan , 1993b Luo 1995 
Data Collection
The results reported in this article were collected in 2005 as part of a larger research project (see Giacobbe (2007) for full details on the research method). The questionnaire was developed following the approach recommended by Dillman (2000) . These included the consideration of a set of criteria to select questions to be included in the questionnaire; keeping questions in it as short, simple and clear as possible; constructing the survey questionnaire in a way that would make it easier to understand and answer; providing clear instructions to respondents. Most questions used in the questionnaire were derived and adapted from prior research. In addition, the survey was pilot tested by requesting four managers involved in international JVs, two academics and a manager of a consulting firm to complete the survey questionnaire and provide comments on the relevance and clarity of each question. Their comments were further discussed at face-to-face meetings or through telephone conversations.
The unit of analysis was Australian parent companies of equity JVs operating outside Australia (equity shares in IJVs). Equity JVs were selected because of the inherent clearer definition of rights and obligations and the direct involvement of each partner by introducing resources and bearing the relevant risk. In equity IJVs parent partners acquire equity interest and invest capital and other resources (see Killing 1982 Killing , 1983 Groot and Merchant 2000; Yan and Gray 1994 
General Characteristics of Australian Parent Partners
We report here characteristics of respondent companies and their IJVs. and mining activities where they can contribute know-how, technology and other resources, and take advantage of local business inputs and possibly lower production costs.
Parent Partners
Companies pursue a JV strategy for many reasons, including the need to access new markets, resources or technology, share or acquire skills, achieve economies of scale, share risk, minimise the uncertainty of diversification, pool resources to undertake large projects or improve competitiveness, and to comply with government regulation (Schillaci 1988; Hung 1992; Harrigan 1985; Bell 1996) . Companies may be motivated by a single or multiple objectives to pursue their strategic business alliances, which may conflict with those of their partners. Different motives may impact on parent partners' management control system choices.
Motives of Australian parent and their foreign partners to JVs are reported in Table 3 The literature also indicates that motives for entering JVs can have an important influence on parent partners' management control system choices, as both will perceive control as the most critical means of fulfilling their strategic intentions (Anderson 1990; Yan and Gray 1994) .
The nature of the influence may be determined by a wide range of elements, including the type of specific motives, how a partner's objectives are phrased (for example, financial/nonfinancial), the breadth of partners objectives for the international JV and the fit between international JV's product and the rest of a partner's business (Groot and Merchant 2000) . Groot and Merchant (2000) , for example, found some evidence of a relationship between parent partner objectives and the choice of focus of control. Franko (1971) found that the type of controls chosen by a parent partner was influenced by the strategy motivating a parent partner to engage in a JV. Specifically, he found that loose controls were used by parent partners of joint ventures resulting from a product diversification strategy, while tighter controls were used by parent partners of JVs to expand the geographical reach of their existing products. Finally, Yan and Gray (1994) found that in the interest of learning, the local Table 5 shows the age of IJVs. The average age of IJVs is quite high, 6.53 years. However, the lower value of the median indicates that half of the IJVs were less than four years old and as shown in Table 5 , 11.46% had operated for less than one year. On the other hand, almost 42% of the IJVs have survived over five years (the longest for 39 years). These findings provide two very important indications. First is that most respondents are involved with mature JVs. Second, the findings suggest good performance for Australian IJVs, given that survival is often used as a key proxy for IJV performance (for example, see Geringer and Herbert 1991; Hatfield et al. 1998) . Table 6 reports the nationality of respondents' IJVs partners by continent/geographic areas.
As one would expect, Australian companies prefer a JV with partners in nearby countries. Australian parent partners provide high levels of resources to their IJVs. The results reported in Table 7 indicate that Australian partners provide significantly higher levels of resources compared to their partner(s) in regard to the provision of technology and management expertise, and slightly higher with regard to marketing and customer services skills. The local partners, instead, make a more significant contribution with regard to product distribution and provision of material inputs.
Provision of critical resources is a strong indicator of a higher level of bargaining power. The literature suggests that bargaining power between partners plays a very important role in shaping parent partner management control system choices (Yan and Gray 1994; Gray and Yan 1992; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Giacobbe 2007) . According to the proponents of bargaining power theory, control of a JV depends on several factors determined by the ability of a partner to bargain with another. Bargaining power factors such as control over critical resources, the availability of alternative partner(s) and the strategic importance of the JV to a partner (stakes) would constitute power bases that can tilt bargaining power in one partner's direction or another (Yan and Gray 1994; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Giacobbe 2007 ).
Management Control Systems
The literature suggests that control of IJVs is a very complex issue. Control of IJVs can be clearly distinguished from domestic operations or fully owned subsidiaries (Anderson 1990; Mjoen and Tallman 1997) and requires special attention.
Parent partners are not free to fully control the operations of their IJVs. The presence of other partner(s) and the 'sharing' principle explicitly or implicitly accepted when it was decided to enter the IJV are significant constraints that limit their ability to exercise control. Geringer and Herbert (1989) provide a very useful model to aid in conceptualising the complex control dynamic of IJVs. They suggest that understanding of parent control in IJVs should consider the following three dimensions:
(1) the focus of control; that is, areas of the operations of IJVs over which parent partners exercise control (2) the extent of control; that is, the degree to which parent partners exercise control over the various activities of IJVs (3) the mechanisms of control; that is, the means by which control is exercised. ranging from formal to informal, that they can seek to deploy to achieve the desired focus and extent of control.
Many factors may determine the actual ability of a parent partner to exercise control, including the level of trust in the other partner(s), motives for entering the JV, relative resources contribution, relative bargaining power and a partner's international experience (Groot and Merchant 2000; Yan and Gray 1994; Giacobbe 2007) .
We now briefly review the three dimensions and report Australian parent partners' assessment of management control systems aimed at monitoring their IJVs operations.
Focus of Control
According to Groot and Merchant (2000, p. 586 over all activities (Schaan 1988; Schaan and Beamish 1988; Geringer and Herbert 1989, 1991; Gray 1994, 2001; Groot and Merchant 2000; Giacobbe 2007 ). Thus there is a need for parent partners to select areas of the IJVs' operations they wish to control. A key indicator of the focus of control exercised by Australian parent partners is the number of managers relative to the international partner(s) provided to the IJV over the last five years in major functional areas. The results are reported in Table 8 .
On average, Australian parent partners provided a larger number of managers than their international partners in planning and operational functions. These are the areas where they also make a more significant contribution of resources (see Table 7 ). In general, however, both partners appear to provide a significant number of managers in all other functional areas.
This finding suggests that Australian parent partners may seek a relatively narrow focus of control.
Other indicators of focus of control could be inferred from the composition of the JV board or management committee, and the right to appoint the IJV's general manager. Table 9 reports on composition of IJVs board/management committees. Most IJVs share equal proportions of board/management committee membership; however, more Australian companies are in a minority position than those in a majority position. 
Extent of Control
The concept of extent of control stems from organisational behaviour research and it refers to the centralisation or the locus of decision-making. Extent of control could be conceptualised as a dichotomous absolute variable (that is, total parent control or no control at all) or as a continuous variable (that is, dominant, shared or minority levels of control exercised over different strategically important activities). The literature indicates support for the conceptualisation of control as a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable (Groot and Merchant 2000; Yan and Gray 1994; Giacobbe 2007 ).
Parent partners may therefore exercise control over selected operational areas (focus) on a continuum from minority to total (extent). Their ability to set the extent of control is determined by factors similar to those influencing control focus, including the strategic importance attached to various areas of operations of their IJVs and the relative bargaining power with other partner(s). Other factors that may determine the extent of control include parent partners' superior knowledge of business processes and other operational aspects, ownership of technology and critical resources, which may determine a de facto total control position.
The extent of control is indicated via the relative influence exercised by parent companies over the same set of IJV's functional areas considered for focus of control. The results are reported in Table 12 . Australian parent partners exercise greater relative influence over a large number of functional areas of their IJVs, although in many cases they appear to share the decisionmaking process with the local partners. 'Public and government relations' is the operational area where local partners exercise a more significant extent of control.
In general, the findings suggest that Australian partners exercise a greater extent of control than their local partner(s) over a wider range of operational areas than those indicated as part of their focus of control. This may be a consequence of superior knowledge and/or ownership of critical business resources by the Australian parent partner.
Mechanisms of Control
Mechanisms of control are tools used to exercise control ranging from strict rules and regulations to social activities. Research on management control systems suggests many different classifications of mechanisms of controls and we now briefly review some relevant to IJVs. Gray (1994, 2001) suggest that controls may be broken down into strategic, structural and operational. Strategic controls aim to determine and monitor goals, strategies and objectives of IJVs. Structural controls refer to the degree of autonomy allowed by parent partners to IJV management (that is, the extent to which the venture is authorised to operate as an autonomous unit). Operational controls refer to controlling everyday operations of the IJV. Bartlett (1986) suggests that mechanisms of control can be broken down into three groups.
The first refers to context-oriented mechanisms; informal and culture-based controls aimed at establishing an organisational context. Examples may be emphasising teamwork rather than a Personnel and cultural controls include socialisation and peer control mechanisms aimed at encouraging positive performance. Makhija and Ganesh (1997) classify control categories on a continuum ranging from highly formal to highly informal on the basis of the type of knowledge each partner seeks. They suggest that:
The more predictable, regular, and explicit the information to be transferred, the more formal and structural the relevant controls are likely to be. In contrast, the more uncertain, ambiguous, and organizationally embedded the information, the more informal the controls will be. (p. 517) Fryxell et al. (2002) In this survey we adopted the two broad categories of mechanisms of control suggested by Fryxell et al. (2002) relabelled as:
(1) formal bureaucratic control mechanisms (2) social promotive control mechanisms. The results shown in Table 13 indicate high reliance of Australian parent partners on formal bureaucratic controls. Of particular interest is the frequent use of planning and budgeting ('Used Often' by 79.12% of respondents), formal authority relationships (68.48%), and standardised procedures and rules (68.13%). These suggest that despite the high level of environmental uncertainty typical of foreign operations, Australian parent partners choose to use a highly structured approach to control.
Australian parent partners also rely, but to a lower extent, on the use of social and promotive mechanisms of control. The results reported in Table 14 indicate a higher reliance on people controls (meetings, groups, networking) than cultural controls (rituals, traditions and ceremonies). In summary, the results of this study indicate that Australian parent partners choose a narrower control focus, but exercise a greater extent of control over a wider set of activities by relying on more extensive use of formal mechanisms of control.
Parent Partner Influence on Design of Control System
The literature indicates that the management and corporate style of parent partners may influence the set-up of their IJVs management control systems, with parent partners preferring features perceived to be similar to their own control systems (Groot and Merchant 2000; Firth 1996) . Parent partners perceiving similarities between the control of IJVs and control of their own operations may feel more confident with the working of the IJV control system, therefore adopting a more relaxed attitude towards the venture and their partner(s). Our investigation reveals that most respondents (72.16% of the total) feel that the management control system of their IJVs is similar to that of their company. Only 13.40% of respondents feel their IJVs' management control system was different.
IJV Performance
The literature indicates that evaluating the performance of IJVs is a very complex issue as these ventures operate in complex, unfamiliar and unpredictable environments (Anderson 1990 ). Thus there is a need to consider the use of a wide range of performance indicators able to link an organisation's strategic determinants and its performance, incorporating accounting and market-based (Seth 1990 ), financial and non-financial performance measures. Geringer and Herbert (1991) note that efforts to identify variables associated with IJV performance have been constrained by disagreement concerning appropriate performance measures and methods. Reviewing the relevant literature, they indicated that some early studies used financial indicators such as profitability, growth and cost position, while others used objective measures of performance such as survival, duration, instability of ownership and renegotiations of JV contracts. Geringer and Herbert (1991) argue that objective financial measures of performance may not always be appropriate because most of the relevant information and data are not reported or published as returns from JVs to parents, which are generally internal and, in some cases, not able to be measured in financial terms. Subjective measures (qualitative factors) may be preferable, but due to their inherent limitation (subjectivity), they may not always produce correct results. The authors therefore tested several hypotheses regarding the reliability and comparability of a range of subjective and objective measures of IJV performance, and evaluated the relative utility of different data collection approaches. They found that objective measures were positively correlated with parent firms' reported satisfaction with IJVs' performance and with perceptions of the extent to which an IJV performed relative to its initial objectives. The evaluation of the venture's performance by one parent partner was also found to be strongly correlated to that of the other partner and to that of the management of the IJV itself. Thus, Geringer and Herbert (1991) concluded that:
(1) in the absence of other performance data the use of subjective measures as reliable performance surrogates may be justifiable (2) it is appropriate to use a single parent company respondent for collecting performance data.
In this survey we used a subjective assessment of IJV's performance by asking respondents to indicate both their level of satisfaction with the overall performance of the IJV and the degree of satisfaction with the achievement of specific performance outcomes. The results are reported in Table 15 .
The performance outcomes cover a wide range of criteria that we grouped into three broad categories: learning performance, product/customer performance, and financial performance. Overall, 77% of respondents perceive that their IJVs have performed satisfactorily, which is consistent with the mature nature of the IJVs reported in this survey, as it would be expected that high levels of dissatisfaction would led to IJV termination. In terms of specific performance outcomes for all dimensions, over 50% of respondents indicated their company was satisfied with the performance of their IJVs. Also, the overall level of dissatisfaction was low for each outcome. The highest satisfaction was with learning performance and the lowest with financial performance, consistent with other results reported in the literature. Finally, market share, profit and cash flow are the areas of lowest satisfaction and highest dissatisfaction, which were the most important motives for engaging in IJVs (see Table 3 ).
Thus, while respondents were satisfied with IJV performance, it would be inferred that their performance aspirations were not fully met.
Summary and Conclusion
In this study we have reported the results of a survey of Australian parent partners of IJVs.
The survey collected data on general characteristics of Australian parent partners, their IJVs, their management control system choices and parent partners' assessment of their IJVs' performance outcomes. Geringer and Herbert's (1989) Overall, the results of the survey indicate two major features of how parent partners control successful IJVs. The first deals with the selection of objects of control (focus of control) and the second with actual exercise of control (extent and mechanisms).
Australian parent partners focus only on a limited set of control objects. They adopt a narrow control focus. This may be due to a number of factors. Objective factors such as the physical distance from the location of their IJVs and the lack of experienced managers are likely to have a significant effect in this regard. However, as noted earlier Australian companies are likely to enjoy a higher bargaining power to that of their foreign partners due to their superior knowledge of business processes and ownership of technology leading to de facto control of their IJVs. Australian parent partners may therefore seek to formally control a narrower set of their IJV operational areas. On the other hand, the foreign partner may seek formal control over a wider range of operational areas to facilitate knowledge and technology transfer.
The second feature deals with extent and mechanisms of control. The results suggest that Australian parent partners seek tighter formalised structures. This is an indication of greater extent of control achieved by using more formal bureaucratic methods. It could be argued that these choices may counter the limitations of narrow focus of control. Despite Australian parent partners formally controlling only a limited set of activities, they seek de facto dominant decision-making power in a wide range of strategically important functional areas, protecting, therefore, their overall interest in the venture.
These findings are similar to those reported in the literature on management control systems used to control operations in international and inter-organisational settings (Pangarkar and Klein 2004; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Fryxell et al. 2002) . Cultural differences, geographical distance and the need to share information and decision-making with other partner(s) may limit the ability of parent partners to control a broader range of functional areas of their IJVs and require them to seek more formal and tighter controls over a limited set of control objects.
Effective and efficient control is not limited to only one of Geringer and Herbert's (1989) dimensions of IJVs control, but involves decisions and choices on each of the three dimensions, which may be affected by several factors including choosing the right partner, strategic motives, bargaining power, and the parent partner's experience and involvement in other international joint ventures (Giacobbe 2007; Yan and Gray 1994; Groot and Merchant 2000) . A better understanding of these and other factors that may determine management control systems choices should be of great interest to practitioners and companies involved in international and inter-organisational operations.
The results of this study provide important indications for companies involved in IJVs or planning to implement such a strategy. Controlling IJVs is always a challenge, both for experienced and inexperienced parent partners. 
